Top-ranking Japanese officers offer their personal perspectives on the war in the Far East. The first edition of this book was lauded by historians and enthusiasts, eager for the Japanese viewpoint, and for the unique nature of these contributions; this new revised edition adds five substantial chapters to the original twelve and provides a full picture of the IJN's role in the war. Most of these moving and fascinating accounts were written in the 1950s and retain the immediacy felt by the writers who had participated in extraordinary events. They provide valuable information on the strategy, tactics and operations of the Japanese fleet, as well as insights into the personalities and motives of the leaders. Here, Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome comes to grips with the allegations that the attack on Pearl Harbor represented strategic folly, political blundering and tactical stupidity. Captain Mitsuo Fuchida describes how his bombing group unleashed 'devils of doom' on Battleship Row, while Mitsuru Yoshida gives an eye-witness account of the sinking of the battleship Yamato.The new contributions to this edition, especially translated for this book, discuss operations in the Indian Ocean, the battle of the Philippine Sea, the protection of merchant shipping, submarine warfare and Japan's overall naval strategy.
A brief introduction precedes each essay to set it in its historical context, while a biographical summary of each contributor is included. A striking collection of photographs and maps augment the compelling text. This is a very significant contribution to our understanding of the Japanese navy in WWII.
DAVID C EVANS (1940-1999), editor of this collection, served in the US Navy as an ensign and lieutenant, USNR. He taught history at the University of Virginia and was the associate dean of the School of Arts and Sciences. He co-authored Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941, also published by Seaforth Publishing.